This Book provides a new analysis of the role that the British played in the shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. To achieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean) this book argues that the British used Greece, first as a way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way to anchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe. While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role that perception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became a central focus of the research. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasis and research into the ways in which the British government managed to convince the United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategic objectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this book. It also addresses the question of whether or not Anglo-American policy was simply a convergence of common Anglo-American objectives, or if it was a result of common objectives created by British influence?
To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British and American documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 to explain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece during this crucial period in history. In so doing it also explains how American foreign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the post-war policy which heavily favours intervention.
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